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The Telecom Regulatory Authority of India<\/a> (TRAI) recently released a consultation paper on \"Assignment of Spectrum for Space-based Communication Services\". It follows a seemingly loaded reference from the Department of Telecommunications<\/a> (DoT) seeking recommendations from TRAI on how satellite spectrum can be auctioned. Fortunately, TRAI's Consultation Paper is wider in scope and discusses other methods besides auctions.
Though not binding on the government, TRAI's recommendations and the subsequent DoT decision could seriously impact the satellite industry's economics. I argue below that auctioning satellite spectrum will exacerbate gaps and deficiencies in India's telecom market and further restrict competition when it should be expanding.
Experts point out that treating satellite spectrum like the one for cellular services is flawed. The two are used very differently. Cellular players need exclusive access to the spectrum, so the current practice of auctioning cellular spectrum makes sense. Satellite players share theirs. Therefore, the auction of satellite spectrum does not make sense. Indeed, countries auctioning spectrum for cellular services still allocate satellite spectrum administratively. It is an inefficient use of a valuable resource if spectrum that multiple players can use effectively is sold to a single highest bidder.
Auctioning spectrum will especially hurt satellite services<\/a> since the latter do not enjoy the economies of their cellular counterpart. Deploying satellite services and the required user terminals are both expensive. There is understandably much greater demand for cellular services, where global economies of scale have driven down the price of network equipment and user devices.
However, satellite services are still relevant. They can fill an important current gap in connectivity; they are cost-effective for rural and remote areas, where cellular services are often more expensive to deploy. Satellite communication also supports niche applications, e.g., in-flight communications, connectivity between bank ATMs, etc. The inclusion of satellite services in the 5G standards and their increasing use for broadband access have boosted the prospects for space communication. Increasing costs of deploying satellite services is to forfeit their new potential.
Higher costs of satellite services will further delay access to communications and broadband to unserved populations and areas that urgently need services. Thus, auctioning satellite spectrum will create additional barriers to deploying crucial technology instead of removing existing ones.
Worryingly, auctioning satellite spectrum will encourage speculation and hoarding of spectrum. Terrestrial players have a manifest incentive to do so, to foreclose competition from an alternative technology. They have the means to do so, as they account for over 99% of the telecom sector's revenues. Auctions can thus block out serious satellite players from the market.
Increasing the cost of deploying satellite services poses an often ignored challenge: India's near-total reliance on cellular technologies for telephony and broadband is a vulnerability. Unlike other major countries, India lacks the fall-back option of a nationwide fixed-line or satellite network. These alternatives lack the versatility and affordability of cellular and pose little threat to the latter's current market dominance. However, their niche strengths and functionalities can be critical in some cases and even life-saving, as experience with natural disasters has often shown.
Besides redundancy in its network, India needs competition – between diverse telecom players, technologies, or business models. Experience worldwide shows that competition in the market provides users with the best guarantee of superior services, choice and low prices. India's users and the economy have manifest stakes in a competitive telecom market.
The TRAI and the government have a vital role in ensuring sustainable competition in the market.
Alternative technologies lack the ecosystem of cellular mobile services. They cannot thrive without regulatory support. Asymmetric regulation is an important tool to mitigate the perils of market concentration. It involves regulating players based on market power. To promote fair competition, regulators wait for new entrants to achieve a threshold market share before subjecting them to burdensome regulation. Such reigning in of incumbents' market power and facilitating new entrants makes sound economic and regulatory sense.
It follows that the oft-repeated demand for the so-called \"same service, same rules\" is untenable. Some incumbent telecom players use this evocative phrase to advocate the same rules for any service irrespective of who provides it, the technology used, or the context or manner of its delivery. This phrase is also frequently employed to demand similar rules for providers of voice telephony and messaging services that can be provided using fixed, cellular, satellite or IP technologies. The argument is now being stretched to advocate identical rules for spectrum allocation, i.e. auction of spectrum for any wireless service, whether terrestrial or satellite.
As I have argued above, such a demand has no basis in economic regulation. Instead, there is an urgent need to preferentially reduce regulatory burdens on new players and technologies to promote sustainable competition.
This approach for boosting weaker markets is not new for India or its telecom sector. For example, TRAI mandated free interconnection between fixed and mobile networks several years before interconnection usage charges (IUC) were completely abolished. Similar steps are needed to seed a viable market for satellite communications.
Unfortunately, the DoT, too, is incentivised to promote auctions, given the large revenues generated for the government exchequer. The Supreme Court<\/a>'s judgment in 2012 in the 2G case, which mandated auctions for all future spectrum allocation, has complicated matters for risk-averse decision-makers. As the TRAI points out in the Consultation Paper, the Court has clarified that the auction mandate is not a constitutional principle that can be applied to all natural resources. However, the stakeholders seem to differ on whether this modifies the earlier judgement requiring mandatory auctions for telecom spectrum.
Ruling out administrative allocation or sharing altogether poses several challenges. Does it mean that the backhaul spectrum must be auctioned as well? Can Wi-Fi services continue to run on unlicensed, i.e. unauctioned spectrum? Can India delicense spectrum in the V bands, as many other countries are increasingly doing to promote new technologies? If not, India's users and industry could lose important opportunities their counterparts abroad already enjoy.
India cannot afford to carve an alternate untested path to auction satellite spectrum, especially if it reduces choice in technologies, services, or both.
The DoT must urgently make a new reference to the Supreme Court to appraise it of these risks and seek a more nuanced order on spectrum allocation. Expediting such a reference could ensure that satellite and other important technologies and services are not hurt or foreclosed. This step is key to resolving the damaging disputes that loom on the horizon and could harm the sector and its consumers.
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拍卖的卫星光谱是糟糕的政策吗?
“拍卖频谱尤其会伤害卫星服务由于后者不享受的经济细胞。部署卫星服务和所需的用户终端都是昂贵的。可以理解更大的对手机服务的需求,在全球规模经济驱动的网络设备和用户设备的价格,“Uppal说。
读到
的印度电信管理部门(火车)最近公布了一份咨询报告在“分配频谱天基通信服务”。它遵循一个看似加载引用的电信部(点)寻求建议从火车上卫星光谱如何被拍卖。幸运的是,火车的咨询文件中更广泛的范围和讨论拍卖以外的其他方法。
尽管政府不具有约束力,火车的建议,随后点决定可能会严重影响卫星产业的经济学。我认为低于拍卖卫星光谱将加剧印度电信市场的差距和不足,进一步限制竞争的时候应该扩大。
专家指出,治疗蜂窝服务的卫星光谱是有缺陷的。使用这两个非常不同。手机玩家需要独占访问,所以当前的拍卖实践细胞谱系是有意义的。卫星玩家分享他们的。因此,拍卖的卫星光谱没有意义。事实上,国家拍卖谱系细胞服务仍然分配卫星频谱管理。是一种宝贵的资源使用的效率低下,如果频谱多个玩家可以使用有效的被卖给一个出价最高。
拍卖频谱尤其会伤害卫星电视服务因为后者不享受的经济细胞。部署卫星服务和所需的用户终端都是昂贵的。可以理解更大的对手机服务的需求,在全球规模经济驱动的网络设备和用户设备的价格。
然而,卫星服务仍然是适用的。他们可以填补一个重要的目前的差距在连接;他们有效的农村和偏远地区,手机服务往往更昂贵的部署。卫星通信还支持利基应用程序,例如,动态通信、银行自动取款机之间的连接等。5 g的卫星服务标准和增加使用宽带接入提高了空间通信的前景。增加部署卫星服务的成本是丧失他们的新潜力。
卫星服务的高成本将进一步推迟访问通信和宽带供水人口和地区迫切需要的服务。因此,拍卖卫星光谱将创建额外的部署至关重要的技术壁垒,而不是删除现有的。
令人担忧的是,拍卖卫星光谱将鼓励投机和囤积的频谱。陆地的球员有明显的动机,取消抵押品赎回权的竞争替代技术。他们有办法这样做,因为他们占超过99%的电信部门的收入。拍卖可以阻挡严重的卫星从市场玩家。
部署卫星服务成本的提高也带来了一个经常被忽略的挑战:印度几乎完全依赖移动电话和宽带技术是一个漏洞。与其他主要国家,印度缺乏全国性的后备选择固话或卫星网络。这些替代方法缺乏通用性和可购性细胞,不会构成什么威胁,后者目前的市场主导地位。然而,他们的利基市场的优势和功能可以在某些情况下甚至是拯救生命的至关重要,随着经验和自然灾害常常显示。
除了在其网络冗余,印度需要多样化之间的竞争,电信的球员,技术,或商业模式。世界范围内的经验表明,市场竞争为用户提供最好的优质服务的保证,选择和低价格。印度的用户和经济表现在竞争激烈的电信市场。
火车和政府有一个重要的角色在确保可持续的竞争市场。
替代技术缺乏细胞移动服务的生态系统。他们不能茁壮成长没有监管机构的支持。不对称监管是一个重要的工具来减轻市场集中度的危险。它包括基于市场力量调节球员。促进公平竞争、监管机构等新进入者达到一个阈值的市场份额前让他们繁重的监管。这种统治在现有的市场力量和促进新进入者具有良好的经济和监管意义。
由此可见,一再要求所谓的“同样的服务,同样的规则”是站不住脚的。一些现任电信玩家使用此唤起短语提倡任何服务无论谁提供相同的规则,使用的技术,或者上下文或交付的方式。这个词也经常用来需求类似的规则的语音电话和短信服务提供商可以提供使用固定的,手机、卫星或IP技术。争论正在延伸到主频谱分配相同的规则,即任何无线频谱拍卖服务,无论陆地或卫星。
我认为,这样的要求没有经济监管的基础。相反,人们迫切需要优先减少对新玩家和技术监管负担,促进可持续的竞争。
这种方法促进较弱的市场并不是新印度或中国电信行业。例如,火车授权免费固定和移动网络之间互连在几年前互连使用费用(IUC)完全废除。类似的措施需要种子一个可行的卫星通信市场。
不幸的是,这个点也是激励促进拍卖,考虑到大型政府财政收入。的最高法院2012年的判断在2 g的情况下,这对未来所有的频谱分配强制拍卖,为规避风险的决策者复杂化。随着火车的咨询文件指出,法院已澄清,拍卖授权不是宪法原则可以应用于所有的自然资源。然而,涉众似乎不同这个修改前面的判断是否需要强制电信频谱拍卖。
完全排除行政分配和共享提出了诸多挑战。这是否意味着回程光谱必须拍卖吗?可以继续运行无牌照wi - fi服务,即unauctioned谱吗?可以在V带印度delicense频段,许多其他国家越来越多地推广新技术做什么?如果没有,印度的用户和行业国外同行已经享有可能失去重要的机会。
印度不能拍卖卫星光谱雕刻一个替代测试路径,尤其是如果它能减少选择技术,服务,或两者兼而有之。
点必须尽快做出一个新的引用最高法院来评价这些风险,寻求一个更微妙的秩序的频谱分配。加快这样的引用可以确保卫星和其他重要技术和服务并不损害或丧失抵押品赎回权。这一步是关键解决织机在地平线上的损害纠纷和可能损害该行业和消费者。
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