卫星通信的谈判新鲜的花,深入分析和观点从受人尊敬的行业领导者

破坏卫星的神话频谱拍卖

“在任何情况下,国际趋势是明确的,它反对拍卖。很少有国家曾经认为拍卖是一个适当的方法甚至分配国内卫星插槽。少数人,要么放弃了练习(例如美国、巴西)或发现此类拍卖的困难(如泰国、墨西哥),”普拉卡什集锦。

阿尼尔•普拉卡什
阿尼尔•普拉卡什 总经理,卫星通信行业协会(SIA-India)

Since 2004, the U.S. has replaced its auction rules with a streamlined administrative process for all satellite spectrums. Virtually all such experiments in the world have been abandoned and the practice of auctioning satellite spectrum has been replacedwith a globally adopted administrative process.

SIA-India would like to clarify that the examples of countries presented in a recent media article, besidesbeing the absolute exception in the global context, do not, in any way, lead to the conclusions on \u201cglobal trends\u201d, \u201crapidly gaining ground globally\u201d or \u201cincreasingly favored across the world\u201d.Suchmisleading statements that intentionally or unintentionally espouse disinformation can impact foundational decisions by the regulator and policy makers.

On the contrary, a deep dive into this issue with the referenced nations presents a totally different picture. The few countries that have attempted to auction the NATIONAL orbital resources, to which, of course, some spectrum will be associated, have failed and abandoned the practice and replaced it with an administrative allocation process. With good reason, it may be reiterated!

Exclusive terrestrial mobile services spectrum has to be managed by a single mobile operator in a given geographic area and, therefore, cannot be shared amongst the operators; while in the case of satellites, the same spectrum is non-exclusive in nature as it can be used by multiple satellite operators to serve the same geographic area.

In other words, assignment by auction for satellite spectrum that can be shared between operators, such as the C\/Ku\/Ka bands, would lead to unnecessary segmentation and can be deemed a very inefficient use of spectrum. For this reason, there are no precedents of spectrum assignment by auction to satellite services in these bands in any country.

Auction of frequency slots for Satellite spectrum usage are explained on the basis of the process being experimented in some of the countries like Saudi Arabia, Mexico etc. What is masked in this explanation is that the auction of spectrum being experimented is for the Orbital slots on geostationary arc along with the associated frequency spectrum.

The auctions mentioned in Mexico, Thailand and Brazil are not for \u201csatellite spectrum\u201d, but for domestic filing\/GSO orbital slots. However, other satellite operators are still allowed, pending the relevant license\/authorization and satellite network coordination, to use the spectrum, as the spectrum, as such, is not being auctioned.

Furthermore, even the very few examples of auctions for domestic filing\/GSO orbital slots have revealed to be mostly unsuccessful. For example, the last time Mexico did an auction for orbital slots allotted to Mexico was in 2014 that failed and it has not attempted this experiment again. A simple web search would bring up news related to this failed attempt.

Brazil abandoned satellite auctions completely in 2020 and replaced satellite auctions vide Law No. 9,472 of July 16, 1997, with administrative process that can be referred to at \u00a7 172, as amended by Law No. 13,879 of October 3, 2019. The consultation of this amendment specifically mentions \u201cIt is also important to highlight that an international benchmark study was carried out, seeking to assess how other administrations deal with the matter. Of the countries analyzed (8 in total), only Mexico adopts a bidding procedure for conferring rights, similar to the Brazilian case.Therefore, there is a mismatch between Brazilian procedures and those adopted by several countries with relevant satellite markets.\u201d

Of course getting this info would need more than a simple web search, but one needs to be diligent about such an important issue instead of making claims that are exactly opposite to the reality.Thailand tried to auction orbital slots in 2021 for the first time, but it was cancelled (only one bidder). Instead, Thailand will be assigning the slots administratively. Being a recent development, the details are available from multiple news sources across the internet.

In line with international best practices, auctioning of the Satellite spectrum is definitely not a desirable solution in the Indian context. An auction for satellite spectrum would artificially limit the number of satellite operators sharing the spectrum and exclude them from the market, as different from terrestrial mobile operators, multiple satellite operators can reuse the same frequency range. The need of the hour is an Open Sky Policy wherein the Satellite operators having capacity over India are permitted to provide full spectrum bandwidth to the Indian public in a competitive manner so that satellite capacity pricing is made available at an affordable level to all.

In any event, the international trend is clear, and it is against auctions. Very few countries have ever thought that auctions are an appropriate method even for assigning domestic satellite slots. The few who have, have either abandoned the practice (e.g. US, Brazil) or discovered the difficulties of such auctions (e.g. Thailand, Mexico).

To make the 5G auction a success and set up its base price, SIA-India requests TRAI that the non-issue of the auction of satellite spectrum be dismissed for what it is, a distraction to the core issue of identification of spectrum for 5G\/IMT and other complementary services including Satellite broadband services.","blog_img":"","posted_date":"2022-01-26 08:23:03","modified_date":"2022-01-26 08:23:03","featured":"0","status":"Y","seo_title":"Busting the myth of satellite spectrum auctions","seo_url":"busting-the-myth-of-satellite-spectrum-auctions","url":"\/\/www.iser-br.com\/tele-talk\/busting-the-myth-of-satellite-spectrum-auctions\/5208","url_seo":"busting-the-myth-of-satellite-spectrum-auctions"}">
电联,通过无线电通信部门(ITU-R)及其执行机构,美国无线电通信(BR),是全球机构负责管理无线电频谱和卫星轨道资源。的193国际电信联盟成员国,很少有包括美国、墨西哥和巴西,曾经试图拍卖卫星光谱在过去。巴西在2020年修改了监管框架来取代卫星与行政许可拍卖。

自2004年以来,美国已取代其拍卖规则,简化管理流程对所有卫星光谱。世界上几乎所有这些实验被抛弃和拍卖的实践卫星光谱一直replacedwith全球采用行政过程。

SIA-India想澄清,国家提出的例子在最近的一次媒体的文章,besidesbeing绝对例外在全球背景下,不要以任何方式,导致“全球趋势”的结论,“全球迅速取得进展”或“世界各地越来越青睐”。Suchmisleading语句有意无意支持造谣会影响基本决策的监管机构和政策制定者。

相反,深入探究这个问题与被引用的国家呈现了一幅完全不同的画面。一些国家试图拍卖国家轨道资源,,当然,一些频谱相关,失败,放弃了练习,取而代之的是一个行政分配的过程。有很好的理由,它可能重申!

独家地面光谱移动服务必须由一个单一的移动运营商在一个特定的地理区域,因此,运营商之间不能共享;在卫星的情况下,相同的频谱在本质上是排他性的,因为它可以被多个卫星运营商服务相同的地理区域。

换句话说,分配卫星频段拍卖中,运营商之间可以共享,如C / Ku / Ka波段,会导致不必要的分割和可以被视为一个非常低效的使用频谱。出于这个原因,没有先例拍卖的频谱分配卫星服务在这些乐队在任何国家。

卫星光谱的使用频率招标是解释过程的基础上,尝试在一些像沙特阿拉伯这样的国家,墨西哥等。什么是蒙面的解释是,拍卖光谱实验是对地球同步轨道槽弧连同相关的频谱。

提到的拍卖在墨西哥、泰国和巴西不适合“卫星光谱”,但对于国内申请/ GSO轨道槽。然而,其他卫星运营商仍允许,等待相关的许可证/授权和卫星网络协调,使用光谱,光谱,因此,没有被拍卖。

此外,即使是很少的例子为国内申请拍卖/ GSO轨道槽显示主要是不成功的。例如,墨西哥最后一次拍卖了轨道槽分配给墨西哥在2014年再次失败,它没有尝试这个实验。一个简单的web搜索将新闻与此相关的失败。乐动扑克

巴西废弃卫星2020年拍卖完全取代卫星拍卖见法律没有。9472年7月16日,1997年,与行政过程,可以在§提到172年,受法律修订的13879号10月3日,2019年。这个修正案中明确提到的咨询”同样重要的是要强调国际基准进行研究,寻求评估其他政府如何处理此事。总共的国家分析(8),只有墨西哥实行招标程序赋予权利,类似于巴西的情况。因此,巴西之间存在不匹配过程和采用的几个国家有关卫星市场。”

当然得到这个信息需要超过一个简单的web搜索,但需要勤于这样一个重要的问题,而不是使现实声称是完全相反的。泰国在2021年试图拍卖轨道槽第一次,但这是取消出价(只有一个)。相反,泰国将分配槽管理。最近的发展,细节可以从多个新闻来源互联网。乐动扑克

符合国际最佳实践,拍卖的卫星光谱绝对不是一个理想的解决方案在印度上下文。卫星频谱拍卖将人为地限制卫星运营商共享频谱的数量,排除他们从市场,从陆地移动运营商不同,多个卫星运营商可以重用相同的频率范围。小时的需要是一个开放的天空政策在卫星运营商有能力在印度被允许提供完整的频谱带宽印度公共竞争的方式,这样卫星能力定价是可用在一个负担得起的水平上。

在任何情况下,国际趋势是明确的,它反对拍卖。很少有国家曾经认为拍卖是一个适当的方法甚至分配国内卫星插槽。少数人,要么放弃了练习(例如美国、巴西)或发现此类拍卖的困难(如泰国、墨西哥)。

使5 g拍卖成功,建立了底价,SIA-India请求火车的问题的卫星光谱被拍卖,分心的光谱识别的核心问题5 g / IMT和其他配套服务包括卫星宽带服务。

免责声明:作者的观点仅和ETTelecom.com不一定订阅它。乐动体育1002乐动体育乐动娱乐招聘乐动娱乐招聘乐动体育1002乐动体育ETTelecom.com不得负责任何损害任何个人/组织直接或间接造成的。


Since 2004, the U.S. has replaced its auction rules with a streamlined administrative process for all satellite spectrums. Virtually all such experiments in the world have been abandoned and the practice of auctioning satellite spectrum has been replacedwith a globally adopted administrative process.

SIA-India would like to clarify that the examples of countries presented in a recent media article, besidesbeing the absolute exception in the global context, do not, in any way, lead to the conclusions on \u201cglobal trends\u201d, \u201crapidly gaining ground globally\u201d or \u201cincreasingly favored across the world\u201d.Suchmisleading statements that intentionally or unintentionally espouse disinformation can impact foundational decisions by the regulator and policy makers.

On the contrary, a deep dive into this issue with the referenced nations presents a totally different picture. The few countries that have attempted to auction the NATIONAL orbital resources, to which, of course, some spectrum will be associated, have failed and abandoned the practice and replaced it with an administrative allocation process. With good reason, it may be reiterated!

Exclusive terrestrial mobile services spectrum has to be managed by a single mobile operator in a given geographic area and, therefore, cannot be shared amongst the operators; while in the case of satellites, the same spectrum is non-exclusive in nature as it can be used by multiple satellite operators to serve the same geographic area.

In other words, assignment by auction for satellite spectrum that can be shared between operators, such as the C\/Ku\/Ka bands, would lead to unnecessary segmentation and can be deemed a very inefficient use of spectrum. For this reason, there are no precedents of spectrum assignment by auction to satellite services in these bands in any country.

Auction of frequency slots for Satellite spectrum usage are explained on the basis of the process being experimented in some of the countries like Saudi Arabia, Mexico etc. What is masked in this explanation is that the auction of spectrum being experimented is for the Orbital slots on geostationary arc along with the associated frequency spectrum.

The auctions mentioned in Mexico, Thailand and Brazil are not for \u201csatellite spectrum\u201d, but for domestic filing\/GSO orbital slots. However, other satellite operators are still allowed, pending the relevant license\/authorization and satellite network coordination, to use the spectrum, as the spectrum, as such, is not being auctioned.

Furthermore, even the very few examples of auctions for domestic filing\/GSO orbital slots have revealed to be mostly unsuccessful. For example, the last time Mexico did an auction for orbital slots allotted to Mexico was in 2014 that failed and it has not attempted this experiment again. A simple web search would bring up news related to this failed attempt.

Brazil abandoned satellite auctions completely in 2020 and replaced satellite auctions vide Law No. 9,472 of July 16, 1997, with administrative process that can be referred to at \u00a7 172, as amended by Law No. 13,879 of October 3, 2019. The consultation of this amendment specifically mentions \u201cIt is also important to highlight that an international benchmark study was carried out, seeking to assess how other administrations deal with the matter. Of the countries analyzed (8 in total), only Mexico adopts a bidding procedure for conferring rights, similar to the Brazilian case.Therefore, there is a mismatch between Brazilian procedures and those adopted by several countries with relevant satellite markets.\u201d

Of course getting this info would need more than a simple web search, but one needs to be diligent about such an important issue instead of making claims that are exactly opposite to the reality.Thailand tried to auction orbital slots in 2021 for the first time, but it was cancelled (only one bidder). Instead, Thailand will be assigning the slots administratively. Being a recent development, the details are available from multiple news sources across the internet.

In line with international best practices, auctioning of the Satellite spectrum is definitely not a desirable solution in the Indian context. An auction for satellite spectrum would artificially limit the number of satellite operators sharing the spectrum and exclude them from the market, as different from terrestrial mobile operators, multiple satellite operators can reuse the same frequency range. The need of the hour is an Open Sky Policy wherein the Satellite operators having capacity over India are permitted to provide full spectrum bandwidth to the Indian public in a competitive manner so that satellite capacity pricing is made available at an affordable level to all.

In any event, the international trend is clear, and it is against auctions. Very few countries have ever thought that auctions are an appropriate method even for assigning domestic satellite slots. The few who have, have either abandoned the practice (e.g. US, Brazil) or discovered the difficulties of such auctions (e.g. Thailand, Mexico).

To make the 5G auction a success and set up its base price, SIA-India requests TRAI that the non-issue of the auction of satellite spectrum be dismissed for what it is, a distraction to the core issue of identification of spectrum for 5G\/IMT and other complementary services including Satellite broadband services.","blog_img":"","posted_date":"2022-01-26 08:23:03","modified_date":"2022-01-26 08:23:03","featured":"0","status":"Y","seo_title":"Busting the myth of satellite spectrum auctions","seo_url":"busting-the-myth-of-satellite-spectrum-auctions","url":"\/\/www.iser-br.com\/tele-talk\/busting-the-myth-of-satellite-spectrum-auctions\/5208","url_seo":"busting-the-myth-of-satellite-spectrum-auctions"},img_object:["","retail_files/author_1623137801_13937.jpg"],fromNewsletter:"",newsletterDate:"",ajaxParams:{action:"get_more_blogs"},pageTrackingKey:"Blog",author_list:"Anil Prakash",complete_cat_name:"Blogs"});" data-jsinvoker_init="_override_history_url = "//www.iser-br.com/tele-talks/satcom/busting-the-myth-of-satellite-spectrum-auctions/5208";">
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